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Abstract
Though it was initially presumed that the primary role of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) would be a residual one of monitoring and ensuring
the fulﬁlment by the State of its obligations under the Rome Statute, it
has over time moved towards a more activist “burden-sharing” role. Here,
the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor initiates prosecutions of the leaders who bear
the most responsibility for the most egregious crimes and encourages national
prosecutions for the lower-ranking perpetrators. Since at least 2006, the Pros-
ecutor has committed to a formal policy of inviting and welcoming voluntary
referrals as a ﬁrst step in triggering the jurisdiction of the Court. The judges on
theCourt have approved these referrals, while the broader academic and activist
communities welcomed this more vertical relationship with national jurisdic-
tions and, signiﬁcantly, have provided the intellectual justiﬁcations for it.
Burden-sharing, a concept unmentioned at the RomeConference establishing
the ICC, is presented as anunproblematic, natural andorganic emanation from
the Statute. This article argues that this development was not in fact inevitable
or mandated by the Rome Statute. It was chosen, and in justifying this choice,
familiar modes of cosmopolitan-constitutionalist treaty interpretation funda-
mentally premised on the ﬁeld’s virtue and indispensability have operated
to enable a Court established as a residual watchdog to become a workhorse
in individual situations by assuming the preponderance of responsibility for
combating impunity.
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The sense of cosmopolitan identity has grown gradually through individuals
advocating for a cosmopolitan approach within whatever cracks and ﬁssures
have appeared in the Statist system of international law. One of the reasons
for the hope placed in international criminal law is its possibility to exploit
these cracks and ﬁssures. International courts and tribunals present a particu-
larly unique opportunity for change as they are answerable to their underlying
legal texts and enjoy substantial autonomy from States. Once organizations or
individuals have a foot in the door, theymay seek to push theﬁeld in a direction
whichmaynot necessarily contribute to the immediatemandate of the relevant
institutions as envisioned by their creators, but which will build towards estab-
lishing the cosmopolitan community.1
I. Introduction: The Emergence of Burden-Sharing
1.As the InternationalCriminalCourt enters its twelfth yearof operation, it has become
apparent that theCourt has three different functions—as a criminal court proper trying
individual cases when they are deemed admissible, as a “world security court”when the
UN Security Court refers a situation under Article 13(b), and as a “watchdog court”
monitoring national proceedings when a case is deemed not admissible under Article
17 by reason of the State’s purported willingness or ability to prosecute.2 The ﬁrst
two functions operate in a vertical framework as the Court enjoys priority over the na-
tional jurisdiction,3 incorporating notions of superior supra-nationality as an inter-
national body4 and implying a relationship of authority by intervening in the
1 David Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40NYU JILP (2008),
1019, 1061–2.
2 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, The Many Faces of the International Criminal
Court, 10 JICJ (2012), 1081, 1083.
3 Assuming that SecurityCouncil referral supersedes the State’s rights to use its national
criminal justice system as the forum of ﬁrst resort, as argued in George Fletcher and
Jens Ohlin, The ICC: Two Courts in One, 4 JICJ (2006), 428, 431–433 and
Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are WeWatching Evolu-
tion or Evisceration?, 8 Santa Clara JIL (2010), 115, 131.
4 The ICC has direct effect characteristic of supra-nationality within the territory of a
State party or one referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council in a number of
areas such as the Prosecutor’s wide-ranging investigative powers in Article 57(3)(d),
her power to directly summon a person where there exists reasonable grounds to
believe he committed the crime alleged in Article 58(7) and her authority to issue
binding arrest warrants within the legal system in art. 58(1). See Sasha Rolf Lüder,
The Legal Nature of the International Criminal Court and the Emergence of Supra-
national Elements in International Criminal Justice, 84 Int’l R Red Cross (2002),
79, 90.
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domain of domestic affairs.5 By contrast, the “watchdog” aspect of the ICCoperates on
a more horizontal framework, rooted in State consent and deferential to the State’s
primacy of action regarding criminal prosecutions. Complementarity is a functional
principle allocating priority among several bodies able to exercise jurisdiction, granting
it to a subsidiary body when themain body fails to exercise its primary jurisdiction.6 In
the Rome Statute, the State justice system was clearly that main body, while the Court
was endowedwithwhat is at best a “stuttered verticality” insofar as theCourt enjoys the
capacity to determine whether national proceedings are genuine and to assert admissi-
bility where they are not under Articles 18 and 19.7
2. One of the most interesting questions that has emerged is whether there is a hier-
archy between these three functions.8 In the earliest days of the Court it seemed that
therewas, with thewatchdog function at the apex. This appeared to be the understand-
ing of theﬁrst ICCProsecutorwhenhe famously emphasized at his swearing-in that the
success of the Court would be determined not by the number of international prosecu-
tions undertaken, but rather by the number of international prosecutions avoided
because of increased functioning of domestic legal systems eager to avoid a ﬁnding of
admissibility.9 An early Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor policy paper on complementarity
echoed this, acknowledging that it would “take action only where there is a clear case
of failure to take national action.”10 Domestic trials would only be displaced in excep-
tional circumstances.11This is in strong contrast to the criminal court proper andworld
security functions where the Court enjoys unfettered freedom to exercise solitary
control over proceedings and a relationship to individual victims and criminals
largely unmediated by State structures after a ﬁnal conﬁrmation of admissibility.
3. Over time, it appears the watchdog function has slipped in the hierarchy as the
Court rejects amonitoring role in favour of assuming the prosecutorial and judicial ini-
tiative in amanner characteristic of amore vertical relationship. The old orthodoxy that
5 Frédérick Mégret, In Search of the “Vertical”: Towards an Institutional Theory of
International Criminal Justice’s Core, in: Carsten Stahn and Larissa van der Herik
(eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (2010), 178, 192 and
180–181.
6 Xavier Philippe,ThePrinciples ofUniversal Jurisdiction andComplementarity:How
Do the Two Principles Intermesh?, 88 Int’l R. Rev. Cross (2006), 375, 380.
7 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 192.
8 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, above n.2, 1094.
9 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of
the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, 16 June 2003.
10 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Ofﬁce of the Pros-
ecutor (2003), 5 (http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9_03.pdf
(accessed: 24 November 2013)).
11 Report of the AdHoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court,UNGAOR, 50th Session, Supp.No. 22, ANDoc. A/50/22 (1995), para.47.
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the Court would operate in a merely residual manner as a “last resort”12 or as a “safety
net”13 may now represent the minority view. The best example of this is the Ofﬁce of
the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) commitment towhat it calls “burden-sharing”, by which the
OTP now states that it “will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear the most re-
sponsibility for the crimes. On the other hand, it will encourage national prosecutions,
where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or workwith the international com-
munity to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means.”14
Since at least 2006, the Prosecutor has committed to a formal “policy of inviting and
welcomingvoluntary referrals as aﬁrst step in triggering the jurisdictionof theCourt”.15
While the old orthodoxy assumed a somewhat jealous relationship between the Court
and national justice systems zealously guarding their prerogatives,16 burden-sharing
based on voluntary relinquishment of jurisdiction by the State through territorial
State self-referrals looks most likely to become the dominant paradigm as it moves
forward. The ICC Prosecutor’s lack of independent enforcement power makes such
a relationship highly attractive as it diminishes the risk of failure to collect evidence
or witnesses, or to foster State co-operation.
4. That something has changed is best illustrated by an examination of the stated
positions of two ICC judges, one from before the point where burden-sharing was
mainstreamed and one from after. In January 2004, the ﬁrst President of the Court,
Philippe Kirsch, endorsed a horizontalist, subsidiary role of the ICC, arguing that
“[i]t is only in extreme cases that the international community should intervene. Nor-
mally there should be no reason to intervene. [… T]he business of the Court is not to
second-guess domestic proceedings.The ICC is not after prosecution.”17Nevertheless,
over time, a new orthodoxy has emergedwhere the Court should assume the burden of
major prosecutions from the State evenwhere it appears able andwilling to undertake at
12 MarkusBenzing,TheComplementarityRegimeof the InternationalCriminalCourt:
International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Im-
punity, 7 Max Planck YUNL (2003), 591, 599.
13 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC—Quo Vadis?, 4 JICJ (2006), 421, 422.
14 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, above n.10, 3.
15 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, Report on the activities performedduring theﬁrst three years
(June 2003–June 2006), 7 (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-
FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.
pdf (accessed 24 November 2013)).
16 HitomiTakemura, ACritical Analysis of PositiveComplementarity, in: StefanoMan-
acorda and Adán NietoMartín (eds.), Criminal Law BetweenWar and Peace: Justice
and Cooperation in Criminal Matters in International MilitaryMatters (2009), 601,
602.
17 From Council on Foreign Relations Brieﬁng, Accountability Versus: The Inter-
national Criminal Court, Federal News Service, 16 January 2004 (http://www.cfr.
org/courts-and-tribunals/accountability-vs-impunity-role-international-criminal-
court/p6696 (accessed 24 November 2013)).
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least some prosecutions, a position best illustrated by Judge Kirsh’s colleague on the
bench, Judge Mauro Politi, six years later:
What is then the ultimate purpose of complementarity? There is no doubt that
one important goal is to establish a division of labour between national jurisdic-
tions and the ICC, under which the Court should essentially concentrate on
those who have major responsibility for the crimes involved.18
Far fromworking constructively to achieve the goal of improved domestic fulﬁlment
of the State’s legal obligations as was initially presumed to be the Court’s main role,
greater attention has been given to how tomake theCourt amore relevant and efﬁcient
actor in the international legal order.
5. A general preference for pro-active burden-sharing or a division of labour between
State and the ICC is notmentioned anywhere in the Rome Statute, was not considered
in the negotiations leading up to it (though Robinson convincingly argues that a more
reactive policy of accepting territorial State self-referrals was),19 and was ignored as a
possibility in the ﬁrst generation of commentary on the new Court in the years
before it began to try its ﬁrst cases. However, circumstances provided a signiﬁcant
spur to its emergence when States like Uganda, DR Congo, Central African Republic
andMali surprised observers by announcing a willingness to request the Prosecutor to
investigate situations occurring on their own territory for the purpose of determining
whether one or more speciﬁc persons should be charged with the commission of
crimesunderArticle14(1) of theRomeStatute.These requests are knownas self-referrals.
In these states of domestic inaction, the Rome Statute left little by way of speciﬁc guid-
ance. The classical watchdog role envisaged in cases where the State was purporting to
undertake proceedings and in which the ICC OTP and Pre-Trial Chambers would
monitor the proceedings to ensure the State was willing and able to do so genuinely
was inappropriate because there was nothing to monitor. Instead, the Court would
react to the inaction by becoming active itself without the need to inquire as to
the nature of the State’s inability or unwillingness. However, from this reactive con-
tingency, a more systematic preference for self-referrals emerged. A pro-active,
burden-sharing “workhorse” role was enunciated whereby the Court actively and
enthusiastically would take the initiative to secure the State’s voluntary relinquishment
of jurisdiction, though assistance would be lent to the domestic justice system to
conduct its own prosecutions, ensuring this burden would be shared.
6.This expansionof the ICC’s role has been treated as entirelynatural andbeneﬁcial.
It is presented not as a reactive exception to the State’s duty to prosecute, but rather as
18 Mauro Politi, Reﬂections onComplementarity at the RomeConference and Beyond,
in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court
and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (2011), 142, 145.
19 Darryl Robinson,TheControversyOverTerritorial StateReferrals andReﬂections on
ICL Discourse, 9 JICJ (2011), 355, 359–364.
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something that is consistent with this duty and at the same time preferable to it. A ne-
cessary reaction to the exigencies of self-referrals has become a policy where the Pros-
ecutor feels entitled to negotiate with all of the considerable pressure her Ofﬁce can
bring to bear with States over the division of prosecutorial labour long before there is
any intimation that the State is unwilling or unable to prosecute. In so doing, the
gradual emergence of the burden-sharing role is a good example of the tendency of
international legal instruments, and in particular those with a human rights and/or
international criminal law nexus, to exhibit an apparently unconscious cosmopolitan
“creep”. Effectively, a policy based on self-referrals which both supporters and detrac-
tors of the concept imagined being extremely rare or unlikely20 (and which some scho-
lars could credibly argue was in fact impermissible under the Statute)21 has become a
cornerstone of prosecutorial policy. The much-trumpeted ideal of “positive” comple-
mentarity has changed from a principle where the Court lends support to States to
undertake themost serious prosecutionswhere their judicial systems areweak to aman-
agerial principle dividing labour between the Court and domestic institutions on the
basis of this weakness. This article argues that the view of burden-sharing as inherently
beneﬁcial or as an organic emanation from the statute should not be as readily assumed
as it is. International criminal legal discourse “transmits and continually reconstructs” a
shared understanding of its history, goals and texts.22 Burden-sharing is a product of
this reconstruction, but the process is not value-neutral—the sources of discursive
assumptions areworth uncovering.This article argues that a dynamic cosmopolitanism
underlies the embrace of burden-sharing.
7. In international law, three schools of interpretation are typically applied, namely
(1) the textual approach; (2) the intent-based approach; and (3) the object and purpose
approach.23 As Wessel argues, interpretation of the Rome Statute’s provisions would
always be oriented on a spectrum between conservative-statist and progressive-cosmo-
politan.24 The greater the emphasis on the former, the less likely “creational checks”
like complementarity or deference to sovereign prosecutorial initiative embedded in
the Statute as a function of the voluntaristic, sovereignty-conscious practice of States
20 Ibid., 379–380.
21 Mahnoush Arsanjani and W.M. Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International
Criminal Court, 99 American JIL (2005), 385 and William Schabas, Prosecutorial
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 JICJ (2008),
731.
22 Darryl Robinson, above n.19, 357.
23 Leena Glover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpret-
ation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EJIL
(2010), 543, 547.
24 Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Insti-
tutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 Columbia JTL (2006),
377, 380–381.
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Partieswould be interpreted strictly.25Textual and intent-based approaches (bearing in
mind the sovereignty-consciousnature of theRomeStatutenegotiations)would tend in
a conservative-Statist direction, but an object and purpose approach offers greater po-
tential for the individual preferences of scholars, activists, actors and judges within or
surrounding the Court to tilt interpretation in a progressive-cosmopolitan direction.
8. This article argues that the emergence of burden-sharing as a policy preference,
permissible under the Rome Statute but certainly not mandated, manifests the
shared objective of global human rights civil society, the like-minded group of States
at the Rome Conference and the professionals involved in international criminal law
for the establishment of a stronger, more cosmopolitan and supra-national Court
than that which emerged in 1998’s negotiations. It illustrates the tendency of scholars,
activists, judges and lawyers in international criminal law to infer verticality or supra-
nationality from the pure idea of international criminal justice on the basis of good-
faith but partial interpretations of texts agreed earlier by sovereignty-conscious States
whowould prefer a more horizontal relationship.26 The expectation of some observers
that the Rome Statute would be construed less as a normal treaty capable of interpret-
ation through standard textual hermeneutics (obviating the need for inquiry into its
objects and purposes) than as a living, international-constitutional instrument of the
global order interpreted on a discretionary, teleological basis appears to have been rea-
lized.27 Burden-sharing may represent a textbook example of the general tendency in
international criminal legal discourse to treat explicit textual restrictions or fundamen-
tal principles like legality, culpability or, in this case, systematic preference for State
primacy in terms of prosecution asmere “artifacts of legal positivism” or as “inconveni-
ent obstacles” obstructing the pursuit of international criminal justice.28
9. It should be noted at the outset that this article is not intended as a critique of self-
referrals.29 It does not in any way deny the legality of self-referrals under the Rome
Statute. Though some argue self-referrals were never contemplated in the Statute,30 re-
ferral of situationsby the territorial Statewas clearly permittedbyArticle 14(1).Though
25 Ibid., 401, citing Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, The Responsibility of Indivi-
duals forHumanRights Abuses in Internal Conﬂicts: A Positivist View, 93 American
JIL (1999), 302, 310.
26 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 198.
27 Jared Wessel, above n. 24, 407–408.
28 Brad Roth, Coming to TermsWith Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality, Global Plural-
ism, and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 8 Santa Clara JIL (2010), 231,
252 and 287.
29 Though it draws on some extant criticisms to show the comportment of burden-
sharing with the spirit of the Statute is partial.
30 William W. Burke-White and Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic
Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the
Uganda Situation, 7 JICJ (2009), 257, 259.
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some critics initially argued that where national courts arewilling and able to prosecute
any relinquishing of jurisdiction was impermissible,31 this article accepts that the crea-
tional checks of Article 17 are not applicable where for any reason a case is not being
investigated by the State.32However, the article draws a distinction between the accept-
ance by theCourt of individual self-referrals fromStates as a reactive (and, itwas initially
assumed, reluctant) measure to combat impunity, on the one hand, and burden-
sharing as a proactive, systematic and enthusiastic policy of dividing labour between
the Court and States by soliciting self-referrals. Those who advocate self-referrals and
burden-sharing appear to conﬂate the two.While the former is a necessary component
of the latter, the latterwas not a necessary product of the former. It is possible to imagine
aCourt which accepts self-referrals reluctantly butwhich does not actively seek referrals
from States. Indeed, to the limited extent such a possibility was considered at the Rome
conference where the ICC Statute was negotiated, this more circumspect vision of the
Court is probably what was envisaged.
10. In exploring how cosmopolitanism trumped circumspection, the article begins
in Section 2 by examining cosmopolitanism, its faith in international institutions like
the ICC and its desire to transcend the domain of sovereign control. Section 3 then
analyses the balance in the Rome Statute between Statist-conservative concessions to
sovereignty incorporated in the complementarity regime and progressive-
cosmopolitan provisions less deferential to the State’s prerogatives. Section 4 sum-
marizes what burden-sharing is and how it tilts this balance in a more vertical
direction, and examines how it contradicts some elements of the Rome Statute
while giving effect to others. Section 5 examines how cosmopolitan interpretative
techniques have been applied to the ICC’s admissibility regime to present the
practice as an unproblematic, natural realization of the Preambular aspirations
of the Statute for a managerial system of jurisdictional allocation. However, in so
doing, it selectively ignores other key principles of the Statute which suggest more
conservative-statist constructions of the text.
II. The Cosmopolitan Faith in International Criminal Tribunals
11. Cosmopolitanism is an ideology that posits that all humans belong to a single, uni-
versal community based on a shared morality.33 It is based on three fundamental pre-
cepts: (a) individualism, whereby individual human beings are the ultimate units of
concern, as opposed to tribes, ethnicities, nations etc.; (b) universality, whereby all
31 See e.g. ibid.
32 Darryl Robinson, TheMysteriousMysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 Criminal
L. Forum (2010), 67.
33 Onora O’Neill, Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice, 26 R. Int’l Studies (2000), 45.
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humanbeings enjoyequalmoral status; and (c) generality,whereby thesehumanbeings
are subjects of concern for all and not merely their fellow nationals or co-religionists.34
There are two strands to cosmopolitan thought, namely moral cosmopolitanism and
legal cosmopolitanism.35 From the ﬁrst of these ﬂows the belief that all humans, and
not merely compatriots or fellow-citizens, come under the same moral standards, con-
sequently rendering the boundaries between nations, States, cultures or societies
morally irrelevant. Legal cosmopolitanism is premised on the need to construct a
global political order incorporating institutional schemes that will preserve and
protect the rights of all human beings everywhere in the world. As a result, schemes
for cosmopolitan law are distinctly different from both domestic law which establishes
the rights and duties that exist between citizens and government, and international law
which establishes the conditions for co-existence between States. Schemes for cosmo-
politan law aspire instead to regulate the conditions which should exist between all
human beings in all States irrespective of national origin or State citizenship.36 This
cosmopolitan conception of theworld inwhichhumans are the subjects of law conﬂicts
with the traditional, State-centric Grotian tradition of the international community in
which States are the exclusive (or almost exclusive) actors on the international scene and
the individuals within them are mere objects, enjoying no rights or liabilities under
international law except insofar as they possess them as a derivative of the State
under the principles governing nationality.37 Though international law is viewed by
most liberals as inherently civilizing (indeed, some argue cosmopolitan desires underlie
thewhole project of international law),38 formany cosmopolitans its horizontal nature
makes it “a second best, a temporary solution that allows us to live with the status quo
until the consequences of […] utopia have been fully worked out.”39 By contrast, a
Kantian model of international community assumes that individuals should be the
focus of international relations as subjects of international dealings in their own
right, with their rights reﬂected in a core of universal values (peace, respect for
human rights, self-determination) that all members of the international community
must respect. These common interests transcend any individual State and unite the
34 Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics (1992), 48, 48–49.
35 Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal Justice:
The Case of the International Criminal Court, 104 Theoria (2004), 69, 70.
36 GarrettWallaceBrown, State Sovereignty, Federation andKantianCosmopolitanism,
11 European J. Int’l Relations (2005), 495, 502.
37 Claire Cutler, Critical Reﬂections on the Westphalian Assumption of International
Law and Organization: ACrisis of Legitimacy, 27 R. Int’l Studies (2001), 133, 141.
38 Both notions are explored in Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:
The Rise and Fall of Modern International Law, 1870–1960 (2001).
39 Martti Koskenniemi, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World, 35
NYU JILP (2003), 471, 484.
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whole of mankind.40 One obvious consequence of such an international community
would be the right or duty of that community to monitor the internal affairs of its
members and interfere to protect certain basic rights.41 Another consequence, and
one of particular relevance to this article, is there needs to be a match between the sub-
stantive law of the global community and institutions that represent that community,
both at the executive enforcement level and at the judicial level.42
12.Cosmopolitan literature evaluates law fromtheperspectiveof the requirements of
mankind tout court and typically places the egoistic values of thenation in contradistinc-
tion to those of universal humanity, generally preferring the latter.43 Consequently,
many cosmopolitans attempt to disrupt the relationship between the individual and
the State and relegate the latter from its status as the primary actor in the international
system.44Thomas Pogge, one of themost inﬂuential contemporary theorists of cosmo-
politanism, argues that State sovereignty should be diffused across different institutions
both above and below the level of the State to break themonopoly of authority it enjoys
over its citizens.45 On this basis, the State enjoys merely derivative signiﬁcance as one
instrument to advance moral universalism.46 Others go further, arguing the sovereign
State is a “mistake, an illegitimate offspring” to be overcome on the path to a depoliti-
cized world of universal human rights,47 the “traditional enemy” of human rights,48
and an “enduring obstacle” to the furtherance of international criminal law.49As
Cassese puts it, “either one supports the rule of law, or one supports state sovereignty.
40 Antonio Cassese, A Big Step Forward for International Justice, Crimes ofWar maga-
zine (December 2003) (http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/
13/cassese2003.pdf (accessed: 24 November 2013)).
41 Daniele Archibugi, Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace, 1 European
J. Int’l Relations (1995), 429, 430.
42 Paul Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the
New International Order, 1 Chicago JIL (2000), 1, 13.
43 Martti Koskenniemi, BookReview:Humanity’s Law, Ruti G. Teitel (Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 2011), 26 Ethics & Int’l Affairs (2012), 395.
44 Amy Eckert, The Cosmopolitan Test: Universal Morality and the Challenge of the
Darfur Genocide, in: Steven Roach (ed.), Governance, Order, and the International
Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court (2009), 205, 216.
45 Thomas Pogge, above n.34, 57–69.
46 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmo-
politan Governance (1995), 233–235.
47 Louis Henkin, That “S”Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 Fordham LR (1999), 1, 2.
48 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice
(2006), 624.
49 Steven Roach, Politicizing the ICC: The Convergence of Ethics, Politics and Law
(2006), 19.
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The two are not […] compatible..”50 Broomhall may not in fact exaggerate when he
arguesmost scholarship in the ﬁeld of international criminal law implicitly or explicitly
presents the reduction of sovereignty in the name of enforcing international human
rights norms as desirable.51 Though the raison d’être of much international human
rights and international criminal law was to spur States to develop institutions that
would secure the rule of law, rectify human rights abuses and punish those responsible
for injustice, values of State sovereignty are lost in this zero-sum game juxtaposition of
sovereignty and universal norms—action by the State appearsmore like a dilution of an
international tribunal than a necessary and beneﬁcial complement to it.
13. This antipathy to sovereignty is heightened in the context of international crim-
inal tribunals given the redemptive faith scholars, activists and practitioners have in the
superiority of these bodies over their domestic equivalents on the basis of their reliabil-
ity, independence and largely unquestioned benevolence.52 As Koller argues, inter-
national criminal law has developed to a signiﬁcant extent because of the individual
and collective identities of those inﬂuencing the course of international law.53 Many
of those who develop, theorize and practice international law (and international crim-
inal law in particular) are driven by a normative ideal that development of the law may
progressively catalyse the establishment of a cosmopolitan community which would
accord all individuals equal moral status, regardless of any national borders.54 Along
these lines, the diversion of cases to the ICC has emerged as a preferred option for its
tendency to maximize at least ﬁve identiﬁable goals of international criminal justice:
• Firstly, when active international criminal courts can fulﬁl three basic functions of
any and all international tribunals—stabilizing normative expectations (restating
the law, enforcing it, punishing deviations), law-making (establishing abstract and
categorical statements as authoritative reference points for later practice, for
example by outlining theories of joint criminal enterprise or rape as a crime
against humanity) and the legitimization of authority (controlling domestic
authority against yardsticks of international law).55 Jessberger and Geneuss, for
example, argue that the ICC has both the capacity and the mandate to ﬁnd the
law, consolidate it and advance it, just as the ad hoc tribunals did.56
50 Quoted in Bruce Broomhall, International Justice & the International Criminal
Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003), 56.
51 Ibid., 58.
52 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 214–215.
53 David Koller, above n.1, 1021 and 1023.
54 Ibid., 1050.
55 Armin vonBogdandyand IngoVenzke,On theFunctions of InternationalCourts:An
Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority, 26 Leiden JIL (2013), 49,
50 and 54–59.
56 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, above n.2, 1083.
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• Secondly, it is argued that global crime automatically calls for global justice on the
basis that international tribunals are bothmore effective andmore legitimate, and
hence more conducive to a true normative universalism.57 The best expression of
this global vision is found in the admittedly exceptional circumstances of the
seminal Tadić jurisdictional decision, when the ICTY Appeals Chamber held
that an international criminal tribunal created by the Security Council “must
be endowed with primacy over national courts” because human nature will
create “a perennial danger” of international crimes being characterized as ordinary
crimes or trials being designed to shield the accused.58
• Thirdly, in its role as a security court it assumes a global role in theworld’s network
of international politics to reduce atrocities and end conﬂict which no domestic
court could perform.59
• Fourthly, international prosecution has awider symbolic effect, acting as “a loud-
speaker echoing the values of the international community”60 and shaping “a new
normative foundation for the society of states.”61
• Finally, international law represents the legalistic desire to seal law off frompolitics
(of the domestic variety, at least) through themechanical, zealous applicationof an
authoritative international criminal apparatus as the path to a more peaceful
world.62
14. Concurrence of jurisdiction between the State and international tribunals inevit-
ably produces tensions. One obvious tension lies in the reality that the more an inter-
national legal apparatus defers to the sovereign discretion of the State on matters of
law,opportunities to realize theseﬁvegoalswill be limited, ifnot foreclosed.Thekeyques-
tion leading into theRomeConference of the InternationalCriminal Courtwaswhether
thebodynegotiatedwould inauguratea revolutionary, cosmopolitanconceptionofworld
society which transcended Statehood or whether deference to the State’s assertion of its
sovereign duty to prosecute and adjudicatewouldwater down theCourt’s jurisdiction. It
is to the balance between these two perspectives that attention must turn.
57 MireilleDelmas-Marty,GlobalCrimeCalls forGlobal Justice, 10European J.Crime,
Crim. L. and Crim. Justice (2002), 286, 286.
58 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on the
DefenceMotion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2October 1995), para.59.
59 Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 JICJ (2006), 434,
441.
60 Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 EJIL
(2002), 561, 592.
61 Jason Ralph, Between Cosmopolitan and American Democracy: Understanding US
Opposition to the International Criminal Court, 17 Int’l Relations (2003), 195, 197.
62 John Czarnetzky and Ronald Rychlak, An Empire of Law? Legalism and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 79 Notre Dame LR (2003), 55, 61–62.
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III. The Balance of the Rome Statute
15.The self-conceptionof cosmopolitan civil society, typically composedof scholars, acti-
vists andnon-governmentalorganizations, is thatof aculturewhichhas liberated itself from
national politics and the claims of popular sovereignty.63 In the negotiations for theRome
Statute a number of these actors presentmade progressive-cosmopolitan calls for the ICC
to serve as the sole venue for prosecuting crimes on the basis that universal jurisdiction ren-
dered certain “hard-core” crimes outside the exclusive authority of States,64 while others
argued it should enjoy primary jurisdictionwith national courtsmerely exercising residual
jurisdiction.65 The diplomats, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scholars,
who drove the ICC negotiations, were generally unconcerned with ensuring national
courts would fulﬁl their duties under international law and discussed the idea of the
Court “long before they even had given the slightest attention to the issue of relations
with national jurisdictions”.66 Delegates were implored not to let “outmoded notions
of state sovereignty […] derail the forward movement” seeking to achieve international
peace and order.67 However, States would not agree to a Court that went so far.
16. Inaddition toPreambular statementsthat“effectiveprosecutionmustbeensuredby
taking measures at the national level”, “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jur-
isdiction over those responsible for international” and theCourt “shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions crimes”, Article 17 appeared to cement a systematic pref-
erence in theRomeStatute for domestic prosecution.Under this provision, for a case to be
admissible before the ICC, the Court must be satisﬁed that domestic authorities have not
pursued or are not pursuing the case. If they have pursued it or are pursuing it, the Court
must satisfy itself that these efforts are/were the product of genuinewillingness and ability
to investigate or prosecute.68 In terms of unwillingness, the Court examines whether:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal respon-
sibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court;
63 Paul Kahn, above n.42, 6.
64 M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), Legislative History of the International Criminal Court:
An Article-by-Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994–1998 (1999), 62.
65 Sharon Williams, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in: Otto Triffterer (ed.) Com-
mentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999), 383,
385–386.
66 Frédérick Mégret, Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical Explor-
ation Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity, in: Jann Kleffner and
Gerben Kor (eds.), Complementary Views on Complementarity (2006), 1, 39.
67 Benjamin Ferencz, Address to theUNDiplomaticConference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 16 June 1998.
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), Article 17(1).
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(b) There has been an unjustiﬁed delay in the proceedings which in the cir-
cumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impar-
tially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circum-
stances, is inconsistentwith an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.69
In terms of ability, the Courtmay inquire as towhether the State is able to undertake
proceedings based on a consideration of “whether due to a total or substantial collapse
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceed-
ings”.70 On a basic textual interpretation of the Article, only when the national pro-
ceedings are non-existent or not genuine can the OTP proceed with an investigation.
As such, Article 17 reinforces State sovereignty71 and afﬁrms that States may represent
themost effectivewayof repressing international crimes.72Outside of SecurityCouncil
referrals, it appeared the ICCwould serve not as the primaryactor in international crim-
inal law, but merely as a vigilant watchdog.
17. The failure to instantiate a form of universal jurisdiction based on ICC primacy
without themediation of the State disappointed thosewithmore cosmopolitan visions
of international law. The exacting admissibility hurdles were initially decried as an un-
seemly sacriﬁce of justice to sovereignty73 and a less than desirable common denomin-
ator.74 NGOs, ﬁnding the Court’s admissibility requirements “at variance with the
better objectives of international criminal justice”, greeted the complementarity
regime with dismay.75 International law, of course, is frequently presented in this
way, embodying a division between its substantive law, which reﬂects the ideals of a
global community, and its institutions, which reﬂect the reality of State privilege,
69 Ibid., art. 17(2).
70 Ibid. art. 17(3).
71 Bruce Broomhall, above n.50, 2.
72 Philippe Sands, After Pinochet:TheRole ofNationalCourts, in: Philippe Sands (ed.),
From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice
(2003), 68, 76–77.
73 Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International Law:
The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 Leiden
JIL (2006), 1095, 1096.
74 Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada, The Principle of Complementarity and Security
Council Referrals, in: Mauro Politi and Federica Gioia (eds.), The International
Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions (2008), 57.
75 Frédérick Mégret, Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of
Complementarity, in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18,
361, 374.
272 Chinese JIL (2014)
producing an unedifying balance between norms and power.76 Though there is an
elementof truth in the argument that formanyof theStates the emphasis on the respon-
sibility of national authorities was self-protective and cynical, it must be acknowledged
that formost States complementarity arose out of a genuine belief that emphasis on na-
tional responsibility was the only way the putative Rome Statute system could be legit-
imate and sustainable.77 From the earliest stages in the negotiation process, States
rejected international primacy on the basis that they “had a vital interest in remaining
responsible and accountable for prosecuting violations of their laws”.78 As noted in the
sixth Preambular paragraph, the “duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes” precedes the Rome Statute, deriving
from the aut dedere aut judicare requirement States accepted in legal instruments
such as theGenocideConventionor theGenevaConventions or fromthe requirements
of international customary law. This duty is realized through genuinely undertaking
investigations, followed by a prosecution, trial or extradition where evidence
demands. State delegations in Rome argued that a permanent ICC with unlimited au-
thority to denyStates the exercise of these sovereignpowerswouldoffend thebasic prin-
ciple of non-intervention, a principle that above all else expresses the democratic
thought that sovereignty resides in the community.79 Though European countries
and civil society wished to replicate the strongly vertical model of the ad hoc tribunals,
most States preferred a horizontal regime, explicitly emphasizing the need to normalize
international criminal justice after the unprecedented primacy enjoyed by the Inter-
national Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).80
18. Nevertheless, State sovereignty did not emerge undiminished from Rome. The
sovereign right to prosecute was no longer absolute but conditional on its proper exer-
cise, legitimizing but constraining the authority the State enjoys over its subjects.
Indeed, even where the duty is exercised properly by the State, the ICC will still be
in a position to judge its satisfactoriness. One sees in this harmonization of national
criminal justice systems with international criminal law vis-à-vis the treatment of
mass atrocity a reining-in of sovereign chauvinism—as Ralph puts it, “the secondary
norms of non-intervention and sovereign/diplomatic immunity are replaced by State
76 Paul Kahn, above n.42, 10.
77 Rod Rastan, Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration, in:Morten Bergsmo (ed.),
Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International
Crimes (2010), 83, 132 and Frédérick Mégret, above n.66, 23.
78 AdHocCommittee on theEstablishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt, Report
of the AdHoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
UN Doc. A/50/22 of 6 September 1995, 31.
79 Rod Rastan, above n.77, 107.
80 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 214.
McAuliffe, Watchdog to Workhorse 273
responsibilities to protect andprosecute.”81 It is for this reason that the response among
cosmopolitans to the ICC gradually became more supportive after the initial disap-
pointment at the failure to achieve primacy.82 For some, the sheer fact of a permanent
international institution applying international criminal law directly to the individual
in the course of proceedings in The Hague made the ICC an inherently revolutionary
project.83 Others, as we will see, saw even greater potential for the Court to become a
more active agent.
19. Overall, the primary characteristic of the admissibility regime is balance. If this in-
novationconstituted aKantian revolution, its deference toclassical,Grotian international
law contained within it a counter-revolution.84 The ICC addresses systematic impunity
resulting from the statist framework, but to the extent it articulates a cosmopolitan vision
of justice it does sowithin that framework. It caters for State authority but responds to the
traditionalWestphalian failure to protect individuals from atrocity, balancing legitimacy
with efﬁcacy, supra-national authority with domestic constitutional orders. This balan-
cing exercise clearly paidoff—the compromises basedoncomplementarity (and territori-
ality and nationality) attracted surprisingly early and numerous accessions from the
Global South to reach the 60 ratiﬁcations necessary for the Statute to enter into force,
a possibility disregarded by the mostly-European group of like-minded States who
insisted on universal jurisdiction and a smaller twenty-State threshold.85
20. One issue that went unaddressed at Rome but which had an obvious pertinence
after 1 July 2002 was whether and how the Court would change from the inert ideal in
the Statute to a living, breathing Court.While any erosion of the admissibility arrange-
ments thatwere agreedwould cause acrisis of conﬁdence in the ICCin theperiodbefore
it came into effect,86 this was less of a concern in subsequent years as institutional con-
cerns of an autonomous Court replaced the need to attract ratiﬁcations and the Rome
conference imperative of cosmopolitan concessions to sovereignty grew remote.
Though international courts are typically presented as the agents of States Parties,
once established, any oversight or sanctioning by States tends to have relatively little
power to restrain their creation once it stands on its own two feet.87 The annual
81 Jason Ralph, Anarchy isWhat Criminal Lawyers andOther Actors Make of It: Inter-
national Criminal Justice as an Institution of International and World Society in:
Steven Roach (ed.), above n.44, 133, 135.
82 Antonio Franceschet, Four Cosmopolitan Projects: The International Criminal
Court in Context, in: Steven Roach (ed.), above n.44, 179, 201.
83 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, above n.2, 1085.
84 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of
International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (2002), 8.
85 William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 JICJ (2013), 545, 548.
86 Michael A. Newton, above n.3, 122–123.
87 AllisonDanner,WhenCourtsMake Law:How the International Criminal Tribunals
Recast the Laws of War, 59 Vanderbilt LR (2006), 1, 57.
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Assembly of States Parties is well suited to considering regulatory matters within the
framework of the Statute, but is a cumbersome mechanism for exercising oversight
in relation to politically contentious, context-speciﬁc policies like burden-sharing. As
Casey points out, all of the ICC functions will be carried out by its own personnel,
divided by bureaucratic authority but not necessarily by interest.88 Because ICC
judges and agents of the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor come from a specialized community
and meta-juridical culture of human rights and academia which import their own pre-
formedpreferences (oftenprogressive-cosmopolitan),89 there is a justiﬁable expectation
that actors on the bench or OTP sympathetic to the progressive development of inter-
national criminal/humanitarian law might engage in policy-making to improve the
status and functionality of the Court.90 International courts generally manifest a nor-
mative bias favouring international legal completeness and dynamism,91 a tendency
magniﬁed in international criminal tribunals by its dominant culture of progressive
development.92
21. This professional inclination towards expansion may be exacerbated by the
exigencies of the ICC. As Batros notes, international tribunals have internal interests
in being active and prominent which are distinct from the external interests of other
entities such as States—once the Court became established, these interests would
naturally come to the fore.93 One need not have been unduly cynical to expect
that the Prosecutor’s rhetorical suggestion that his own idleness would represent
success might diminish in the cold light of day given the ICC’s consistent need to
88 Michael A.Newton, above n.3, 144, citing argumentmade in Lee A.Casey, TheCase
Against Supporting the International Criminal Court, in Washington University
School of Law International Debate Series No. 1 (2002).
89 As Snyder and Vinjamuri observe, “[l]egalists who stress these justiﬁcations for war
crimes tribunals have permeated human rights-based nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), international organizations, and universities. More than any other profes-
sional class, lawyers have moved freely among these institutions and taken leadership
roles in the international tribunals whose creation they have advanced.” (Leslie
Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International
War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 7 Annual R Political Science (2004),
345, 358).
90 JaredWessel, aboven.24, 419–421and447.UpdatingWessel’sﬁgures from2006 (at
449–450), from an examination of the web-pages of the seventeen judges serving on
the ICC’s three chambers as of April 2014, it would appear that twelve of the judges
have experience in academia, eleven have worked in human rights NGOs or been
appointed to human rights or humanitarian bodies, eight have done both and only
two have done neither.
91 RichardH. Steinberg, Judicial Law-Making at theWTO:Discursive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 American JIL (2004), 247, 258.
92 David Koller, above n.1, 1050.
93 Ben Batros, The Evolution of the ICC Jurisprudence on Admissibility, in: Carsten
Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 558, 595.
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justify its budget and avoid the type of inactivity that would “kill” the Court.94 As
Schabas notes:
The suggestion that the Courtmightmeasure its success by a paucity of cases was
not a very compellingmessage for States Parties, whowere investing large sums of
money in the institution and who expected to see trials and convictions.95
He convincingly argues that the convoluted self-referral by the DRC of Thomas
Lubanga (already being prosecuted by the Congolese for crimes of greater gravity than
recruitment of child soldiers for which hewas ultimately indicted)was the product of im-
patience where “we had to get an indictment quickly”, setting a pattern for future
conduct.96 Since then, the ICC has been struggling to assert its credibility, above all
because of its lack of judicial productivity in securing only one conviction in its ﬁrst
ten years. Furthermore, the rejection of four out of 14 cases brought by the Prosecutor
to the ConﬁrmationHearing Stage, the acquittal ofMatthieuNgudjolo and the contro-
versial withdrawal of charges against Kenya’s former civil service head Francis Muthaura
have threatened the Court’s credibility.97 Admissions that we are in the “post-romantic”
phase of the ICC98 or that the “honeymoon” is over are both commonplace and accur-
ate.99 Constant activity appears to have been adopted as a response to this status anxiety
and the inter-related riskof irrelevance.While there are principled justiﬁcations foractive-
ly seeking more cases, a mindset of “looking for business” has made Court–State inter-
actions quite different from those envisaged in Rome.100
22. While on a plain reading of Article 17, the admission of a case to the Court
appears a “drastic”101 response to State failure, some scholars made early predictions
94 This concern was best expressed at a Round Table in June 2004, when ICC judge
Theodor Meron noted that without a critical mass of cases, State Parties would ques-
tion whether the Court was worth sustaining and Mauro Politi acknowledged that it
was difﬁcult to convince ambassadors to support the Court when it only had one trial
(RoundTable: The ICCRelationshipWithNational Jurisdictions:What Future?, in:
Mauro Politi and Federica Gioia (eds.), above n.74, 133, 135 and 156).
95 William A. Schabas, The Rise and Fall of Complementarity, in: Carsten Stahn and
Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 150, 156.
96 William A. Schabas, “Complementarity in Practice”: Some Uncomplimentary
Thoughts, 19 Crim. L. Forum (2008), 5, 32–33.
97 William A. Schabas, above n. 85, 546-547.
98 Payam Akhavan, The Rise and Fall, and Rise, of International Criminal Justice, 11
JICJ (2013), 527, 527.
99 DavidLuban, After theHoneymoon:Reﬂections on theCurrent State of Internation-
al Criminal Justice, 11 JICJ (2013), 505, 505.
100 Paul Seils, Making Complementarity Work: Maximizing the Limited Role of the
Prosecutor, in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 989, 989.
101 Frédérick Mégret andMarika Giles Samson, Holding the Line on Complementarity
in Libya: The Case for Tolerating FlawedDomestic Trials, 13 JICJ (2011), 571, 578.
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that Article 17’s requirements “may chafe an ICCprosecutor that sees themas an overly
restrictive manifestation of arcane sovereignty principles”.102 These predictions have
been vindicated by the emergence burden-sharing based not merely on tolerance
for self-referrals but on active pursuit of them. Considering the general perception
after Rome that a largely conservative body had been agreed upon and the fact that
the concept of a division of labour based on State referrals ﬁnds no support in the
travaux préparatoires or academic commentary before 2003, burden-sharing clearly
represents an imaginative augmentation to that which was agreed in Rome. After all,
the admissibility regime was formulated on the presumption that the ICC was not
inherently superior,103 forming a hierarchy of jurisdiction where the body in The
Hague constituted merely a permanent reserve court.104 As Section 4 goes on to
argue, burden-sharing has a reactive, practical root as a necessary emanation from the
policy decision to accept self-referrals. However, because some of these reactive and
practical justiﬁcations have proven unsatisfactory and are indistinguishable in practical
terms from “looking for business”, burden-sharing also enjoys more principled ration-
alization ﬂowing from a cosmopolitanism-inﬂuenced, constitutional reading of the
Statute. Before moving on to this, it is necessary to examine these principles. Even if
we assume burden-sharing ﬁts within the letter of the Rome Statute, many aspects of
it jar with its spirit to the extent that the presentation of the policy as a natural by-
product of theCourt’s admissibility arrangements ismore complex than simplistic pre-
sentations of the Rome Statue’s teleology would suggest.
IV. Burden-Sharing: Legally Permissible, Philosophically
Questionable?
23. The hitherto unimagined (or at least unelaborated) concept of burden-sharing was
outlined in a 2003 Informal Expert Paper entitled “The Principle of Complementarity
in Practice”, which envisaged situations where the appropriate course of action may
appear to be for a State to voluntarily accept admissibility before the ICC of certain
cases under a consensual division of labour.105 As noted in the introduction, following
such voluntary acceptance, theOfﬁce of the Prosecutor will initiate prosecutions of the
leaders who bear the most responsibility for the crimes (those in de jure or de facto
102 Michael A.Newton, Comparative Complementarity:Domestic JurisdictionConsist-
ent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 Military LR
(2001), 20, 68.
103 Ibid., 64.
104 Ruth Mackenzie, Cesare P. Romano and Philippe Sands, Complementarity in the
Rome Statute and National Jurisdictions (2008), 4.
105 ICCOfﬁce of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complemen-
tarity in Practice (2003), 19 (www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.PDF,
accessed: 24 November 2013).
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hierarchical control and other causally signiﬁcant actors who commit exceptionally
egregious crimes notwithstanding their low placement in the hierarchy of atrocity)
and will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpe-
trators.106 This policy, it is argued, would “enhance the delivery of effective justice, and
is thus consistentwith both the letter and the spirit of theRomeStatute and other inter-
national obligations with respect to core crimes”.107 The presumption is that from the
stagewhere the prosecutor becomes aware of a situation, he can engage in dialoguewith
the State over the parties and incidents it intends toprosecute, if any.108Once a division
of labour is agreed, a further presumption is that national justice processes broadly
understood will be supported (albeit in an undeﬁned way) in their prosecutions of
other perpetrators as part of a phasedwithdrawal to leave a sustainable impact, crucially
distinguishing burden-sharing from self-referrals simpliciter.109
24. Examples of these types of agreement abound, and dominate the Court’s active
case-load. The OTP agreed on a division of labour with Uganda whereby the former
would prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility,110 and repeated this with
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.111 Though the current Kenyan cases before
the Court proceed through the Prosecutor’s proprio motu authority, the Agreed
Minutes formalized at the meeting of the Prosecutor and the representatives of
Kenya’s Government in 2009 stated that if a special tribunal or other judicial mechan-
ism could not be agreed between in parliament, the Government of Kenya would refer
the situation there to Prosecutor in accordancewith Article 14with an implication that
the latter would then divide prosecutorial responsibility.112 Central African Republic
andMali have also made self-referrals, while investigations in Côte d’Ivoire consented
to initially by Laurent Gbagbo and later requested by Alessane Ouattara represent a
106 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, above n.10, 3.
107 Informal Expert Paper, above n.105, 19.
108 Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 Criminal Law Forum
(2008), 87, 106–107.
109 First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,Mr LuisMoreno-
Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June
2005, 10 (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CC6D24F9-473F-4A4F-896B-
01A2B5A8A59A/0/ICC_Darfur_UNSC_Report_290605_EN.pdf (accessed 24
November 2013)).
110 Luis Moreno Ocampo, Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Address at the Inter-
national Conference in Nuremberg, Nuremberg (24 June 2007).
111 Remarks by ICC Prosecutor LuisMoreno-Ocampo, 27thmeeting of the Committee
of Legal Advisors on Public International Law, Strasbourg (18 March 2004).
112 Agreed Minutes of the Meeting between Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and the
delegation of the Kenyan Government, The Hague 3 July 2009, 2 (http://www.
icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1CEB4FAD-DFA7-4DC5-B22D-E828322D9764/
280560/20090703AgreedMinutesofMeetingProsecutorKenyanDele.pdf (accessed
24 November 2013)).
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highly convoluted self-referral viaArticle 12(3), notwithstanding its technical status as a
proprio motu investigation. At all times, the Prosecutormade clear his willingness to en-
courage (though crucially, not ensure) domestic prosecutions. Where a State does
nothing to prosecute a case (an implied self-referral) or announces it will not (an
express self-referral), an agreement with the State to voluntarily renounce jurisdiction
in these contexts would undoubtedly be quicker than the convoluted admissibility pro-
ceedings seen inArticles 17–19. Some argue that referral of a situation by the territorial
State would fulﬁl its Preambular duty to “exercise criminal jurisdiction” to the extent
that it is consistent with the customary obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, and
is therefore satisﬁed by surrender of a suspect to criminal proceedings that result in
prosecution.113
25. As a pragmatic response to a situationwhere a State freely admits it cannot or will
not prosecute a situation or case, acceptance by the ICC of self-referrals would be un-
objectionable and, itmight be added, unavoidable. Thewisdomof the uncontested ad-
missibility situations originally envisaged in the Informal Expert Paper, namely where
the State justice system is too incapacitated to undertake any trial (e.g. Central African
Republic) or where “[g]roups bitterly divided by conﬂict may oppose prosecutions at
each other’s hands and yet agree to a prosecution by a Court regarded as neutral and
impartial” (e.g. a highly precarious military stalemate or power-sharing peace agree-
ment) is inarguable.114 However, advocates of self-referrals have not stopped at this re-
active justiﬁcation for the policy, and go on to proactively outline a number of obvious
advantages to a broader policy of burden-sharing. The general thrust of the argument is
that the Rome Statute formalizes the idea that impunity must be fought at both the
international and the domestic levels, and as a result there should be no objection to
a policy where they mutually reinforce each other. Burden-sharing offers obvious op-
portunities for co-ordinated investigations and evidence gathering between the State
and The Hague, and may foster an environment of co-operation that might mutually
enhance arrest, detention, transfer/extradition and enforcement of sentences. The
Appeals Chamber since Katanga has deemed self-referrals permissible under Statute,
consistent with its goal of limiting impunity and accepts there may be “merit” in as-
sumption by the ICC of some of the State’s duty to prosecute.115 Because the division
of labour is negotiated and consensual, it allows for individuals and crimes to be con-
sidered on acase-by-case basis and effectively grants the State a choice of jurisdiction.116
As Gioia puts it:
113 Informal Expert Paper, above n.105, 19.
114 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, above n.10, 5.
115 Prosecutor v. Katanga&Chui, CaseNo. ICC-01/04-01/07OA8, Judgment on the
Appeal ofMr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12
June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, para.85.
116 Ben Batros, above n. 93, 601.
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A“friendly”versionofcomplementarityreliesontheassumptionthattheICCisnot
meant to act as a censor of national jurisdictions but rather to allow for the most
efﬁcient sharing of competencies between the national and international level.117
Advocates of burden-sharing contend that referral of the most sensitive cases to the
ICC could avert the danger of domestic victor’s justice, freeing the State up for a com-
prehensive accountability policy for less contentious indictees.118 If a domestic court
lacks expertise, infrastructure or security, the State may agree the ICC is a superior
forum.119 One can assume the standard of trial available in The Hague will be as
good as, if not better than, that in any State recently or presently subject to war or re-
pression.120 From the ICC’s point of view, the obvious resource and capacity con-
straints of a Court that can only try a handful of cases at any given time (and which
does so with inordinate slowness) makes a deﬁned pathway to domestic assumption
of responsibility attractive.121 A guaranteed role for the ICC increases judicial coverage,
while commitment to encouraging prosecutions at the domestic level avoids territorial
State inertia thatmight occur if a casewas found admissible in TheHague.122 The self-
referrals which underpin burden-sharing can be commended for beingmore reassuring
to the State concerned (and the Court’s critics) than the bold wielding of the Prosecu-
tor’s proprio motu powers, and hence more likely to attract the co-operation of the
State.123
26. When presented simply as a mechanism for “collaboration and synergies across
multiple fora”,124 the case for burden sharing at ﬁrst glance appears incontestable, an
inevitable product of the Rome Statute, and hence consistent with its spirit as well as its
letter.However, on closer inspectionmanyof themore assertive arguments in favour of
pro-active burden-sharing areweaker than superﬁcial analysis based on theweakness of
the State and the comparative strengthof theCourtwould suggest. Self-referral raises far
more complex questions than the uncomplicated, synergistic, co-operative models
envisaged. Space precludes a detailed examination of self-referrals, but they have
117 Federica Gioia, Complementarity and “Reverse Cooperation”, in: Carsten Stahn and
Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 807, 817
118 Ruth Mackenzie et al., above n.104, 321.
119 Darryl Robinson, above n.32, 97.
120 This idea of “comparative advantage” is examined in the next section.
121 William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 Harvard ILJ (2008),
53, 102.
122 Jan Kleffner, Complementarity as a Catalyst for Compliance, in: Jan Kleffner and
Gerben Kor (eds.), above n. 66, 79, 91–92.
123 Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of Self-Referrals a Sound Start for the ICC? 2 JICJ (2004),
949, 950.
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280 Chinese JIL (2014)
proven the Court’s most problematic issue, generating a number of principled objec-
tions, which can brieﬂy be summarized:
(a) A justiﬁable suspicion exists that self-referral by the territorial State gives it too
much control over the process, allowing it to discredit its internal enemies while
securing its own impunity as the ICCwill be too reluctant to alienate it lest on-
going prosecutions be jeopardized through lack of co-operation.125 The fact
that only Lord’s Resistance Army members have been indicted and no arrest
warrants have been issued for Ugandan government agents, for example, has
raised suspicions of a quid pro quo agreement with Kampala, though the Pros-
ecutor denies it.126 Referrals by Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Joseph
Kabila and Central African Republic’s (subsequently deposed) Francois
Bozizé of situations within their territories were rewarded with situation inves-
tigations and indictments that targeted their enemies or political rivals and not
their governments, notwithstanding clear evidence of serious crimes bynational
armed forces.127 Because the ICC lacks enforcement power, it is dependent on
national assistance for access to crime scenes, execution of arrest warrants and
protection for witnesses. This requires a co-operative relationship, making
investigations that would jeopardize relations with the Congolese, Malian
or Central African Republic leaderships unattractive to the Prosecutor. This
can call into question the impartiality an international court was assumed to
exemplify.
(b) Neither of the Ugandan nor Congolese self-referrals were fully voluntary—in
both cases the ﬁrst ICC Prosecutor requested a self-referral by letting the
State know that if one was not made, he would employ his proprio motu
powers to investigate after authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber.128 This
in turn undermines one of the main justiﬁcations for burden-sharing,
namely its consensual nature, particularly when one notes how self-servingly
the Court has applied the same conduct test employed by Chambers under
125 Mark Drumbl, Policy Through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial as Justice, in:
Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 197, 214. In Prosecutor
v Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-704-red3-tENG Application Chal-
lenging theAdmissibilityof theCase pursuant toArticles 17 and19(2)(a) of theRome
Statute (25 February 2010), theDefence argued the ICCput itself “at risk ofmanipu-
lation by transient governments” who might “exploit the ICC to eliminate their old
enemies” (para.68).
126 Kenneth Rodman and Petie Booth, Manipulated Commitments: The International
Criminal Court in Uganda, 35 HRQ (2013), 271, 284.
127 Ibid., 296–297.
128 Paola Gaeta, above n.123, 949–950 and Christopher Hall, Positive Complementar-
ity in Action, in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 1014,
1018.
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Article 17 to determine whether a State is proceeding with the same case.129
Though contrasts are drawn between the “threat-based”, “competitive” and
“passive” nature of classical complementarity contained in the text of Article
17 and the “gentle”, “constructive” and “positive” nature of burden-
sharing,130 the preference for consensus over competition is somewhat self-
serving if the competition is engineered by the Prosecutor. The distinction
between “passive” complementarity entailed in waiting for the State’s unwill-
ingness or inability to become manifest and “positive” engagement with it to
allocate burdens is signiﬁcantly over-stated—inspection of the Preamble and
relevant articles suggests that the Statute never intended to separate national
and international jurisdiction fully, and instead envisaged a process of forma-
lized interaction. Though the Rome Statute prioritized the State’s duty to pros-
ecute, it never envisaged ICCpassivityor competitiveness.As theCourt put it in
the Kony admissibility case:
Considered as a whole, the corpus of these provisions delineates a system
whereby the determination of admissibility is meant to be an ongoing
process throughout the pre-trial phase, the outcome of which is subject to
review depending on the evolution of the relevant factual scenario.131
The basic framework of admissibility envisages an active court operating as a
catalyst for States whomight otherwise be reluctant to allow their judicial insti-
tutions to investigate, prosecute and try cases, even in the absence of any scheme
of burden-sharing.132
(c) Themost common criticism of self-referrals, however, is that they create a “per-
nicious incentive” to do nothing in terms of post-conﬂict justice other than to
externalize the responsibility.133 Though the judiciaries in Uganda and DR
Congo appeared fully capable of trying the cases they referred to The Hague,
the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor pressed aggressively for self-referrals.134 The
policy has been criticized for running contrary to the ethos of the Rome
129 SarahNouwen, Fine-tuning Complementarity, in: Bartram S. Brown (ed.), Research
Handbook of International Criminal Law (2011), 206, 212–214.
130 Rod Rastan, above n.77, Carsten Stahn, above n.108, 89 and 102.
131 Prosecutor v. Kony and others, Case No.ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (10 March 2009),
para.52.
132 Jann Kleffner, above n.122, 82, Christopher Hall, above n.128, 1017.
133 Mark Drumbl, above n.125, 200.
134 William A. Schabas, above n.21, 743 and Nidal Jurdi, The International Criminal
Court and National Courts: AContentious Relationship (2011), 149–161 and 170.
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Statute which prioritized the State duty to prosecute and for contradicting the
Prosecutor’s stated policy to encourage national prosecutions.135 While the
initial presumption was that the modalities of the complementarity regime
would stimulate States to develop an ability to exercise jurisdiction, it instead
encourages “laziness” on the part of the State’s judicial apparatus.136 As
Burke-White argues, the Court appears to have renounced its most powerful
tool, namely the ability to “incentivize, nudge or cajole” reluctant national gov-
ernments to undertake domestic prosecutions.137
(d) Finally, advocates of burden-sharing miss one obvious point—if the State feels
unable or unwilling to try a case of a major criminal or is found to be so, how
then can it be prepared to try someone only slightly further down the criminal
hierarchy? Even if a division is drawn between complex “big ﬁsh” and less
complex “small ﬁsh” cases (though given the ICC’s stated ambition to try
only handful of cases, the division would be probably be one between senior
leaders and upper middle-management ones), the State cannot be presumed
tobe equipped to copewith the latter,whichwill still involve immense technical
difﬁculties and may prove equally sensitive politically. As Glasius argues:
There is a logical inconsistency at the heart of the positive complementarity
doctrine: complementarity teaches that the ICC is only supposed to take
up situations where States are “unable” or “unwilling” to investigate or
prosecute—but positive complementarity in situation countries demands
that the same States suddenly recover their ability and willingness with
regard to all the perpetrators the ICC does not have capacity to try.138
Though advocates of a division of labour argue burden-sharing and its over-arching
“positive” complementaritydoctrine should serve to strengthendomestic jurisdiction,139
the Prosecutor has denied any ambition to act as a “development agency”.140 Though
135 Phil Clark, Chasing Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State Referral in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El
Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 1203.
136 Nidal Jurdi, above n.134, 180.
137 W.W. Burke-White, Reframing Positive Complementarity, in: Carsten Stahn and
Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 341, 347.
138 Marlies Glasius, A Problem,Not a Solution: Complementarity in theCentral African
Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, in: Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El
Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 1204, 1218.
139 Carsten Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the Sense and Sensibility of
“Classical”, “Positive” and “Negative” Complementarity, in: Carsten Stahn and
Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), above n.18, 233, 262.
140 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complemen-
tarity, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/8/51 of 18 March 2010, para.42.
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the OTP and Registry have instead accepted a more catalytic role as co-ordinators of as-
sistance by States and international non-governmental organizations, critics have argued
uncontested admissibility might “shrink” domestic willingness to pursue other cases
(after all, self-referral is presented by its advocates as a fulﬁlment of the State’s
duties)141 or foster free-riding on the ICC,142 while the ICC’s myopic focus on its
high-proﬁle cases may result in the neglect of perpetrators that in theory have been left
to the State.143 There exists a risk (one possibly already realized) that the Court will
operate on a cynical model of “an inwardly focused court whose primary concern is
not the well-being of societies recovering frommass atrocities, but instead the mainten-
ance of a docket that will maximize the Court’s own visibility and prestige”.144 Though
presented as collaboration, burden-sharing in effect often means the Court assumes
almost all responsibility for prosecution. In DR Congo, Uganda, Central African
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, the States concerned have been very reluctant to
assume their putative share of the burden.
27.None of these criticisms invalidate self-referrals per se—as noted above, there are
many advantages to uncontested admissibility and a rational division of labour. These
criticisms are relevant, however, insofar as they show that self-referrals contradict as
many of the principles of the Rome Statute as they support. Burden-sharing has
involved the Prosecutor and Court in a signiﬁcant degree of judicial policy-making,
which usually takes the form of either reactive gap-ﬁlling or proactive judicial activ-
ism.145 While the embrace of self-referrals in reaction to unexpected and unforeseen
cases of complete State inactivity can be considered an example of necessary gap-
ﬁlling (where an institution has failed to articulate a speciﬁc rule governing an emerging
dilemma), the expressed, systematic preference for burden-sharing mimics a more am-
bitious form of judicial activism by relaxing justiciability requirements to expand the
court’s jurisdiction, loosely construing the applicable law and thereby progressively
expanding it.146 On the basis of the above criticisms, burden-sharing looks less like
the revitalization of the Rome Statute than a gloss for what Akhavan describes as
“the temptation of institutional self-perpetuation”.147 A large, multi-layered, multi-
skilled system of international criminal justice achieving with the State a common
goal of non-impunity is attractive if one assumes the global community is a more ap-
propriate frame of reference than a national one, but it is not what was agreed at
141 Takemura, above n.16, 613.
142 William W. Burke-White, above n.121, 62.
143 Alexander Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and
the International Criminal Court, 50 Virginia JIL (2009–2010), 108, 143.
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Rome, where only a residual primacywas left to the ICC.On this view, burden-sharing
may not represent the realization of complementarity, but rather its failure.
28. Why then has burden-sharing emerged to prominence if it is open to political
favouritism, less consensual than imagined, contradictory to the onus placed on
States and premised on a questionable assumption that States can selectively lose
and regain their competences to undertake trials? One could argue it is a predictable
and pragmatic emanation from the unanticipated frequency of self-referral, but advo-
cates of such a role have not been content to leave it at that. Burden-sharing has been
presented by its supporters not as a reactive policy to State inactivity but as a key or-
ganizing principle. As noted earlier, since at least 2006, the Prosecutor has admitted a
formal “policy of inviting and welcoming voluntary referrals as a ﬁrst step in trigger-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court”.148 If the context-speciﬁc claimsmade for each self-
referral are questionable for their politicization, lack of consensuality and failure to
ensure fulﬁlment of the domestic share of the burden, it is necessary to turn to the
larger, more systematic claims made for the policy. As the next section goes on to
argue, these claimsﬂow from the cosmopolitan identity of theCourt’s actors and sup-
porters, a community concerned more with progressively developing the Court in a
vertical direction that the more horizontal nature of the negotiated Statute would
suggest.
V. Interpreting the Rome Statute: Transcending State Primacy
29. Three main interpretative techniques on the progressive-cosmopolitan end of the
interpretative spectrum have been employed to argue that the Rome Statute
demands a more activist, burden-sharing Court. The ﬁrst is the argument that the
Statute ismerely provisional, awaitingprogressive development through statutory inter-
pretation andpractice.The second is to argue theRomeStatute is in fact aconstitutional
document,while the third is to identify ambiguities in the complementarity regime, the
resolution of which requires recourse to the teleology of the Statute. All three
approaches draw heavily on the open-ended and aspirational language of the Preamble.
30. It is best to begin with the ﬁrst of these. Though some cosmopolitans were dis-
appointed with the Rome Statute’s apparent privileging of State sovereignty, others
subsequently adopted a more optimistic view that the Rome Statute was designed to
“enhance and bring to fruition the modern, Kantian model of the international com-
munity […] a practical and symbolic articulation of the scheme and a powerful push to
its full realization”, implying there was something latent and emancipatory within the
Statute that could later transcend ostensible textual limitations.149 Notwithstanding
the clearly-expressed desire of States to place the initiative with States and to limit
the Prosecutor’s role, there has always been a sense among supporters of the ICC
148 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, above n.15, 7.
149 Antonio Cassese, above n.40.
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that theCourt agreed in 1998 is somethingmerely provisional that will evolve in amore
cosmopolitan direction. Jessberger and Geneuss admit the ICC “is not (yet) a true
supra-national legal institution”150;Cassese positioned theCourtwithin a “transitional
period” in which new values will eventually transcend embedded sovereign condi-
tions151; while Stahn argues the Statute is “geared towards long-term change” and
that this “should be kept in mind in interpretation”.152 The more sceptical Newton
saw the key test of the Court’s ﬁrst twenty years as whether it could erode the principles
of State sovereignty that thus far limit it.153 Therewas little suggestion by States Parties
at Rome or 2010’s Kampala Conference that the ICC Statute contains within it the
seeds of a gradually more vertical Court system. At the latter, States Parties appeared
to ﬁre a shot across the bows of self-referrals by passing a resolution conﬁrming that
the struggle against impunity required ﬁrst and foremost that States prosecute serious
crimes committed in their territory or by their nationals.154 However, the view that
the Statute can be subject to evolutionary, progressive re-interpretation ﬁts very
much with the cosmopolitan worldview, one in which the international order is in a
“primitive state” that will inevitably change over time,155 and where international
law consists of previously imperfect obligations in a constant but gradual process of
being perfected.156 As Koskenniemi puts it,
International law is vindicated, not as a ready-made institutional design, but
rather as a completely open-ended political project, a professional commitment
to imagine different futures and to be ready to criticize whatever present there is,
and thus make room for that which is emerging.157
31. This tension between textual restraints and an apparently natural, constitutional
evolution of the Statute has been present since its earliest days. As noted in the intro-
duction, the question of whether the Statute would be interpreted as a constitutional
instrument of the global order, as opposed to a simple treaty, was all-important in
seeing how far it could go as a political project. A constitutional view would require a
150 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, above n.2, 1087.
151 Antonio Cassese, above n.40.
152 Carsten Stahn, above n. 139, 280.
153 Michael A. Newton, above n.3, 123.
154 International Center for Transitional Justice, Meeting Summary of the Retreat on
Complementarity after Kampala: The Way Forward (2010), 1 (http://ictj.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/ICTJ-Global-Complementarity-Greentree-2010-English.pdf
(accessed 24 November 2013)).
155 Paul Kahn, above n.42, 13.
156 Patrick Hayden, above n.35, 83.
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functional approach to the Rome Statute for the simple reason that is has to function,
being the foundation for a rule of law for an entire community—questions of intent and
vitalitywouldbecomeprimarybases of interpretation andwouldgive judges freedomto
promote the functionality of the Court.158 By contrast, if it was treated as a standard
treaty interpreted under the Vienna Convention, judicial actors would naturally
adopt a more textualist approach, with reference to the intent and purpose of the
treaty made only where the text would lead to an absurd result—gaps, vitality and
function would ﬁnd little place in the inquiry.159 International criminal tribunals
have a marked tendency towards the former approach—as Megret puts it, there is “oc-
casionally a constitutional quality to claims of verticality, as if international criminal
tribunals […] sought to portray themselves as no longer as simply an inspiredmanifest-
ation of the inter-state world, but as one of the ﬁrst manifestations of a cosmopolitan
one”.160 The aggrandizement of the ICC’s function bears the hallmarks of this ap-
proach. Notwithstanding the restrictions of the Statute, scholars on the cosmopolitan
wing of the Court argued the ICC was a manifestation of the international commu-
nity’s self-constitutionalization incorporating individuals as “world citizens”,161 a
“Constitutional Moment in international law—a decision to equilibrate the constitu-
tional, organic structure of international law, albeit sotto voce”.162 Weller, noting the
wide-scale participation of States and 250-plus worldwide NGOs, contends that the
Rome Conference exercised the functions of an international constitutional conven-
tion.163 On these lines, Sadat argued the Rome Statute should be treated like the
UN Charter as a nascent constitution, through which “the international community,
including not only states but global civil society, seized upon imaginative ways to bring
about the shifts in constitutional structure necessary to permit international law to
respond to the needs of international society and changing times”.164
32. It has long been accepted that human rights advocates frequently apply less rigor-
ous standards of analysis to certain international legal provisions in order to support
their desired policy positions.165 Expansive interpretation of international legal
158 Laura M. Pair, Judicial Activism in the ICJ Charter Interpretation, 8 ILSA J. Int’l &
Comparative L. (2001), 181, 192, cited in Jared Wessel, above n.24, 407.
159 Ibid, 191.
160 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 220.
161 Bardo Fassbender, Comments on Chapters 1 and 2 of Frédéric Mégret and Gerben
Kor, in: Jan Kleffner and Gerben Kor (eds.), above n.66, 73, 75.
162 Leila Nadya Sadat, above n.84, 79.
163 MarcWeller, Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the
International Criminal Court, 78 Int’l Affairs (2002), 693, 700.
164 Leila Nadya Sadat, above n. 84, 79.
165 Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General International Law: ACom-
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McAuliffe, Watchdog to Workhorse 287
instruments tend to foster an uncritical reception by supporters of international crim-
inal law as victories of humanitarianism over sovereignty.166 There exists much scope
for conﬂict between “strict” and “liberal” interpretations throughout the Rome
Statute, with diametrically opposed views of the role of the State.167 For example, El
Zeidy demonstrates a conﬂict between Article 19(4)’s fortiﬁcation of the State’s
duty to prosecute and Article 19(8)– (11)’s reinforcement of the Court’s ability to
intervene, arguing that an emphasis by the Court on the former would suggest the
Rome vision of complementarity had succeeded, while an emphasis on the latter
would show the ICC emerging as a supra-national institution “with implied primacy
which, although not reﬂected in its statute, is reﬂected in its practices”.168 Indeed,
the Court itself has admitted that “[t]he importance of complementarity can be con-
sidered from various points of view, such as those of the States-parties, the ICC or
the accused”, acknowledging a potential clash of interpretations between Court and
States Parties.169
33. Notwithstanding the deluge of commentary on the drafting processes of Article
17 and its place within the Statute overall, advocates and scholars have demonstrated a
strong desire to unmask instances of vagueness, ambiguity andunclearness in the provi-
sions of Article 17 that would permit clariﬁcation through teleological reasoning.170
The best example of this is Delmas-Marty, who argues that exploitable ambiguities
and lacunae in the Rome Statute can be found and that these arise as a result of the
fact that theCourt is dominated by a politically sovereignmodel despite operating prin-
cipally within a universalist legal framework.171 On similar lines, Stahn ﬁnds “norma-
tive ambiguity” in the Statute’s admissibility regime, opening it to development of
policies on forum allocation that the “deceptive”wording of Article 17 appears to pre-
clude.172 The Statute as a whole certainly contains gaps, inconsistencies and overlaps
that ﬂow from the rushed nature and equivocal compromises of the Rome Confer-
166 Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden JIL
(2008), 925, 957.
167 AndreasMuller and Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals onTrial: FromPanacea toPatient,
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ence.173 However, the explicit wording of the Preamble (replete with references to the
State’s duty to prosecute) and Articles 17–19 (repletewith conﬁrmations of the ICC’s
subsidiarity) are areas in the Statute that deliberately leave little room for ambiguity,
representing as they do very hard-fought reconciliation of the tension between sover-
eignty and universalism, showing little of the dubiety and nuance diplomats typically
use to bridge gaps between substantively different positions.174 At best, the texts of
Article 17 and the Preamble offer limited, and often contradictory support for the
concept of burden-sharing. Complementarity was the “deal-breaker” in negotiations
on the creation of the ICC175—its raison d’être was to provide “detailed procedural
guidance designed to balance sovereign enforcements against unreasonable extensions
of ICC prosecutorial power”.176 The drafters deliberately tried to leave as little oppor-
tunity as possible for later reinterpretation of the Statute177 lest support for it be unrav-
elled.178 They appear to have been unsuccessful.
34.When deciding the extent of their own powers, agents within international tribu-
nals can either do so on an inductive, bottom-up reasoning that anchors verticality in the
actual text of the treaty or a deductive, top down reasoning that infers verticality from a
“pure idea” of international criminal justice drawn less from explicit provisions than the
spirit and purpose of the text, loosely deﬁned concepts of inherent jurisdiction and the
transcendental quality of the institution’s goals.179 In justifying burden-sharing, sup-
porters of the concept began to depart from strict textual arguments derived from the
horizontal nature of the Rome Statute to a type of teleological-constitutional reasoning
based on the implicit normative premises onwhich the Rome Statute is based, which of
necessity incorporates a greater degree of verticality. AsMegret argues, this implied ver-
ticality “captures and is constitutive of the identityof [InternationalCriminalTribunals]
in away that no amountofdetailed studyof discreetprovisions of the statutes of tribunals
can fully convey.”180 These “naturalist-functionalist” interpretations are based on a
combination of telos and necessity which have “an almost inebriating effect in which
the sky is the limit when it comes to the range of powers that the tribunals can grant
173 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court:
Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text, Vol. 1 (2005), 193.
174 JohnD.Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in: Roy S. Lee (ed.), The Inter-
national Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues Negotiations and
Results (1999), 41, 41 and Sharon Williams, above n.65.
175 Kristina Miskowiak, The International Criminal Court: Consent, Complementarity
and Cooperation (2000), 40.
176 Michael A. Newton, above n.3, 116 [abstract].
177 Mahnoush Arsanjani and W.M. Reisman, above n.21, 389, fn.18.
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themselves through Kompetenz–Kompetenz”.181 In terms of teleology, advocates of
expansive roles for the ICC can point to the gravity of crimes, the link to global security,
its superior standards of fair trial and the need to clarify international law as purposive
justiﬁcations for broadening the opportunities for activity, disregarding textual provi-
sions that suggest a more limited remit for the Court.
35. The best examples of this expansive, verticalizing and constitutional conception
of the Rome Statute are those which urge a reading of the Statute as not merely com-
patible with burden-sharing, but as mandating it. Though Article 17 appears clear in
its prescriptions, Stahn argues that this is just an institutional, dispute resolution di-
mension of complementarity (though, as the previous section argues, this “disputive”
paradigm is somewhat exaggerated). There is, he argues, a second,unspokenbut broader
“systemic” dimension that organizes a distinct legal system in which the ICC and do-
mestic jurisdictions reinforce each other to institutionalize accountability for mass
crimes.182 In identifying this system (which no-one at the Rome Conference appears
to have noticed, or at least referred to) he eschews a strictly text-based approach, and
instead prefers to base his conclusions on three over-arching meta-principles of effec-
tiveness, impartiality and fairness.183 These meta-principles are in turn structured
around four fundamental components, namely forumselection, vertical andhorizontal
dialogue,mutual co-operation and incentive-based compliance underwhich a decision
about the proper forum for justice is not exclusively based on national failure, but can
instead take into account the comparative advantages of domestic and international
forums in dividing labour.184 Similarly, Robinson, though acknowledging that the
Statute represents a systemic preference for national prosecutions, refers to the Pre-
ambular aims to “end impunity”, ensure crimes “must not go unpunished” and
“enhanc[e] international cooperation”, to demonstrate that the Statute shows
concern for effectiveness at any level.185 He argues that in any case falling short of
a State undertaking effective prosecutions without political, logistical, ﬁnancial or
political barriers, a managerial approach where the choice of forum is decided by
comparative advantages (effectiveness, efﬁciency, impact) should apply.186 Along
similar lines, Sadat has argued competences should be repartitioned between national
and international jurisdictions on the basis of a quasi-federal organization,187 while
Gioia contends that the Statute set up a pluralist system in which complementarity
181 Ibid., 200.
182 Carsten Stahn, above n.108, 90–91.
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operates as a device to allow joint, simultaneous pursuance of the ultimate goal of
ending impunity.188
36.Whenweighing up a case-hungry ICC against a shattered national justice sector,
the comparative advantagewill invariably lie with the former, especially if the concerns
of the international justice community in highest-quality trial, victim involvement,
consistency with the corpus of international criminal jurisprudence etc. are prioritized.
As Megret notes elsewhere, a tribunal’s comparative reliability in the ﬁght against im-
punity is always central to claims for its verticality.189 This comparative advantage (a
phrase which ﬁnds no place in the Statute or travaux préparatoires) may explain the
general support for the self-referrals from reasonably functional States like Uganda—
from the perspective of a global system of justice, allocation of senior criminals to
TheHague and less serious criminals to the State is both a rational and a preferable div-
ision. It is hard to argue against concepts like co-operation, fairness and non-impunity.
These readings of the Statute do not actively violate either the text or the spirit of the
Statute.However, their positionon the cosmopolitan-progressivist endof the interpret-
ative spectrum ismade apparent from their reliance on selective, self-serving readings of
the Statute’s complementarity provisions and Preamble.
37. To begin with the latter, Stahn and Robinson agree that effectiveness “played an
important, if not dominant, role in the justiﬁcation of complementarity”.190However,
this assertion runs contrary to the historical record of what the States agreed in the
Statute negotiations. State delegations rejected the initial International Law Commis-
sion inclusion of “effectively” in what became Article 17 because they worried that a
concern with effectiveness would allow the Court to intervene wherever it believed it
could investigate, prosecute or try more efﬁcaciously than the State.191 The qualiﬁer
“genuinely” in Article 17 in relation to investigation and prosecution was preferred
to a concept of effectiveness to speciﬁcally preclude the ICC fromassuming jurisdiction
simply because it could undertake proceedings with greater competence or speed,192
making it difﬁcult to accept it could form an over-arching meta-principle for the
Rome Statute even where one adopts a systemic view of it. Similarly, both Stahn and
Robinson also refer to fairness as a fundamental criterion guiding admissibility
under a managerial system.193 Stahn cites Article 54(1)(c) requiring the Prosecutor
to “fully respect the rights of persons”, Article 55 (rights of persons during an investi-
gation), Article 67 (rights of the accused) and Article 21(3) specifying that application
188 Federica Gioia, above n.73, 1106, 1115 and 1116.
189 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 214.
190 Carsten Stahn, above n.139, 276 and Darryl Robinson, above n.32, 96.
191 Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of
the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 Crim. L. Forum (2006), 255, 273.
192 John D. Holmes, above n.174, 674.
193 Carsten Stahn, above n.139, 247 and Darryl Robinson, above n.32, 96.
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and interpretation by the Court must be consistent with internationally recognized
human rights.194 However, these provisions apply to the Court when it is trying a
case but do not relate to the admissibility of that case before this point is reached—as
Mégret and Samson argue, to apply Article 21(3) “as a basis for the Court to insist
upon admissibility is a considerable stretch”.195 Again, it is hard to accept a principle
like fairness that was rejected both by the majority of scholars196 and the Prosecutor197
as a grounds for admissibility in cases of contested admissibility could form one of the
over-arching meta-principles that would underpin the putative “Rome System of
Justice.”As for the supposed impartiality meta-principle underpinning themanagerial
system, it was noted earlier that the complementarity regimewas built on the presump-
tion that the ICCwas not inherently superior to domestic jurisdictions by reason of its
independence of the State.198 Itwas furthermore noted earlier that the operationof self-
referrals in practice have called into question the Court’s impartiality given its reliance
on the territorial State’s government and its tendency to focus on rebels over State
actors.
38. Self-serving interpretations are also visible elsewhere. Stahn rightly distinguishes
between the ordinary exercise of admissibility when the State undertakes inadequate
proceedings (where the Court’s action is residual), on the one hand, and situations
where the State is completely inactive, or claims to be (where the Court enjoys
primacy). He therefore argues that tests of willingness and ability in Article 17 are rele-
vant in the former, but are not prerequisites in the case of uncontested admissibility—
there is no need to inquire into them and thereby raise the types of awkward questions
that might call into question the good faith of the self-referral. This view is correct and
correspondswith the position of theCourt in theKatanga199 andBembaGombo200 ad-
missibility hearings. However, in justifying his systemic-managerial view of
194 Stahn, above n.139, 247–248.
195 Frédérick Mégret and Marika Giles Samson, above n.101, 575.
196 Heller’s rejection of the “due process” thesis is the most cited example, but see his
partial qualiﬁcation of it: Kevin Jon Heller, Why the Failure to Provide Saif with
Due Process is Relevant to Libya’s Admissibility Charge, Opinio Juris (2012) (http://
opiniojuris.org/2012/08/02/why-the-failure-to-provide-saif-with-due-process-
is-relevant-to-libyas-admissibility-challenge/ (accessed 5 November)).
197 TheOfﬁce of the Prosecutor has rejected suggestions that due process deprivations in
Libya generally or the Gaddaﬁ and Senussi cases particularly should have led to a
ﬁnding of unwillingness. See Prosecution Response to Application on behalf of the
Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Saif Al-Islam
Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01), ICC Doc. 11-167-Red, 5 June
2012, at paras.8 and 45.
198 Michael A. Newton, above n.100, 64.
199 Katanga Appeal, above n.115, para. 78.
200 Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, Judgment on the
appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of
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complementarity, he resurrects the provisions of Article 17 (plus Articles 18 and 19
which ﬂow from contested admissibility challenges) from obsolescence to demonstrate
the Court’s concern with effectiveness, impartiality, fairness and co-operation even
though the articles in question are clearly premised on State activity.201 In effect, he
is arguing that Article 17 is irrelevant in questions regarding the legality of individual
self-referrals, but is of use in illustrating the comportment of a systematic policy of in-
viting self-referrals with the Rome Statute as a whole.
39. Stahn furthermore supports his managerial theory of the ICC by pointing to
Article 54(1)(b), which requires the Prosecutor to “take appropriate measures to
ensure the effective investigation and measures to ensure the effective investigation
and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”, and Article 93(10),
which allows the ICC to co-operate with States to enable them to carry out genuine
investigations and prosecutions.202 Though these powers are certainly consistent
with a burden-sharing system, they are equally consistent with an approach where
the State is assisted in its primacy. Indeed, these articles were formulated with this in
mind.203Meta-principles of encouragement for, or deference to, national proceedings,
ﬁnd an equally strong textual basis as guidingprinciples forRomeStatute interpretation
as those of effectiveness, fairness or impartiality, if not stronger.
40.None of this is to argue burden-sharing is impermissible, a disingenuous reading
of the Statute or unwise, though credible cases can and have been made on all three
scores. However, it does show how selective teleological approaches to interpreting
the Rome Statute can become. Mégret, though not referring to burden-sharing, suc-
cinctly describes the typical course of cosmopolitan expansion of the purposes of inter-
national criminal tribunal as follows:
The claim [to verticality] begins as something grounded in various indicia, only
to elevate itself gradually to higher spheres, via the teleological and the implied,
until it becomes derived from sheer identity (“we are international”) and neces-
sity (“we must be able to prosecute these crimes”).204
Burden-sharing’s growth from limited, context-speciﬁc necessity based on an un-
foreseen gap in the text to aggrandizing constitutional principle provides an excellent
example of this subtle claim to greater verticality in action.
24 June 2010 entitled “Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Chal-
lenges” (19 October 2010), para.107.
201 See e.g. Carsten Stahn, above n.139, 250–251.
202 Ibid., 265.
203 See e.g. Sharon Williams, above n.65
204 Frédérick Mégret, above n.5, 217.
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VI. Conclusion
41. This article has explored the cosmopolitan faith of international criminal lawyers,
activists and judges in international criminal law and the resulting teleological impulse
to apply expansivemodes of interpretation to admissibility provisions in the interests of
maximizing the impact of its main institution, the ICC. The largely unforeseen fre-
quency with which uncontested admissibility would emerge freed the Prosecutor to
enunciate and then develop a burden-sharing policy that distributes responsibility in
confronting international crime to either partner, depending on the forum of greatest
convenience, which of coursewill normally lie inTheHague. TheCourt has embraced
this policy by accepting self-referrals in individual cases, and the academic and advocacy
communities have supplied the intellectual justiﬁcations for a broader policy of pro-
active burden-sharing built upon it. Admissibility, of course, is but one example of
this cosmopolitan tendency to loosely construe applicable provisions to increase the
coverage of international criminal law. Robinson, pointing to the by-now familiar
broadening of the scope of criminal liability through doctrines like command respon-
sibility and joint criminal enterprise notes a commonly-used interpretative technique
whereby (i) a purposive interpretive approach is explicitly adopted; (ii) it is assumed
that the exclusive object and purpose of an international criminal law enactment is to
maximize a certain interest such as victimprotection (or judicial activity, or clariﬁcation
of the law); and (iii) this presumedobject andpurpose is allowed to dominate over other
considerations, “including if necessary the text itself”.205 Just as a preoccupation with
maximizing the protection of victims leads to a simple, one-dimensional, teleologically
driven task of identifying the broadest articulation of a given crime to widen the net of
culpability,206 a preoccupation with maximizing the role of the ICC can lead to a one-
dimensional, teleologically driven impulse to widen the net of jurisdiction. The
problemwith such teleologically selective reasoning is that is conﬂates a general justify-
ing aim of the criminal law system (protection of fair trial values or prosecution of
crimes by a globally authoritative ICC) with the question of whether a given action
(punishing a particular individual or assuming the State’s duty to punish) is justiﬁed
in a particular instance. This can only serve to foster contradictionswith the fundamen-
tal principles (like fair trial or the State’s duty to prosecute) the system was designed to
uphold.207
42. This article has argued that, contrary to the presentation of burden-sharing by its
advocates, there was nothing inevitable about its emergence as a policy option, and nor
is it something explicitly requiredby theRomeStatute. In adoptingburden-sharing ini-
tially, the unforeseen frequencyof voluntary self-referral (to the extent it was unforeseen
and not actively solicited) can explain the ﬁrst instances of this policy, but to turn this
205 Darryl Robinson, above n.166, 934.
206 Ibid., 937.
207 Ibid., 938.
294 Chinese JIL (2014)
into an organizing principle of the Court required a speciﬁc, conscious choice. This
choice was adopted in part due to the institutional imperative to remain busy, but pri-
marily ﬂowed from a cosmopolitan assumption that the ICC is a better venue for trials
of themost serious international crimes than the domestic forum towhich primacywas
reluctantly conceded in Rome. As noted in the introduction, in international law three
schools of interpretation are typically applied, namely (1) the textual approach; (2) the
intent-based approach; and (3) the object and purpose approach. The textual approach
provides support for (or,more accurately, does not explicitly contradict) self-referrals in
the narrow case of uncontested admissibility, but does not appear to ground a more
expansive policy of actively seeking them or dividing labour consensually. The
intent-based approach brings us back to the Rome Statute negotiations and highlights
the emphasis placed on vindicating State primacy and the explicit rejection of a com-
parative advantages approach based on efﬁciency, fairness or perceived impartiality.
An object and purpose approach argument can certainly be made that the Rome
Statute establishes a shared task in combatting impunity between the ICC and the
State which can be allocated based on certain competences. However, an equally
strong, and less selective, case can be made out that it is not a shared task but merely
a shared goal, the tasks of which are exercised separately on the basis of a tiered jurisdic-
tion where the State is expected to exercise its responsibility to prosecute.
43. Robinson has argued that the study of the ideological commitments of human
rights advocates and humanitarians is important in understanding ICC developments
as their “assumptions and methods of argumentation [are] not only a cause of depar-
tures from fundamental principles, but also furnishes the analytical steps by which
suchdepartures are effected andprovides the legal plausibility that allows the departures
to pass unnoticed”.208 The emergence of burden-sharing yields a good example of this
phenomenon in action. The ICC disappointedmany when it failed to ground a single,
universal community based on a sharedmorality. However, as the preambular quote at
the start of this article by Koller suggests, cosmopolitan-inclined actors have always
proven willing to exploit any cracks and ﬁssures to push international criminal law in
a direction which may not necessarily correspond with that envisioned by its creators,
butwhichwill build towards establishing amore cosmopolitan institution.The Statute
outlines a common goal for States and the Court to achieve State prosecutions, but this
has purposively and over time become conﬂated with a common task through a select-
ively teleological reading of the Statute. The purpose of this articlewas not to argue that
burden-sharing is unwise. The acceptance of State referrals, the fundamental building-
block of burden-sharing, is the only practical response to instances of complete State
inaction or voluntary referral. It is also imperative in the initially narrow set of circum-
stances envisaged in the Expert Paper, namelywhere the State justice system is too inca-
pacitated to undertake any trial or where antagonists in a stalemated conﬂict see the
208 Darryl Robinson, above n.166, 930.
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Court as the only acceptable neutral arbiter.Thebroader questionofwhether theCourt
by reason of its greater expertise, neutrality and global role is better suited to the most
senior prosecutions in weakened States (bearing in mind the explicit assumption in
burden-sharing that the State is capable of undertaking at least some trials) is one
that reasonable people will disagree over. What this article has concerned itself with,
however, is how burden-sharing manifests the cosmopolitan impulse to disregard ap-
parent textual limitations to gradually increase the role and verticality of international
tribunals through selectively purposive readings of statutes. Burden-sharing helps
realize the Rome Statute as a living instrument and assists it in avoiding unhelpful sov-
ereign restrictions that diminish its effectiveness as a constitutional instrument of a
more human global order, but we should not pretend this development was inevitable,
mandated or imperative. It was chosen, and in justifying this choice, familiar modes of
cosmopolitan-constitutionalist treaty interpretation have been applied that have taken
the Court in a direction not envisaged in the 1998 negotiations. Teleogical, constitu-
tionalist arguments about international criminal law fundamentally premised on the
ﬁeld’s virtue and indispensability have operated to enable an ICC established as a
residual watchdog to become a (Trojan?) workhorse in individual situations, enthusi-
astically dissuading States from prosecuting and rendering merely optional the State’s
duty to prosecute that was so central to the agreed jurisdictional scheme in the Statute.
296 Chinese JIL (2014)
